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On the Source, Site, and Modes of Domination 
Abstract: 
This article seeks to examine how domination manifests in social relationships 
and institutions. It does this by examining two debates in republican literature. 
The first of which is whether domination requires institutionalisation? This 
addresses the source of domination. The second debate is on the nature of 
arbitrary power. This raises questions about the site of domination. It will be 
argued that the source of domination can be personally or socially constituted 
and that the site can be interactional or systemic. This yields four modes of 
domination that can be used to examine social institutions and relationships. 
This paper is interested in two conceptual puzzles about how domination manifests in 
society. The common theme of contemporary republicanism is that someone is 
dominated if she is subjected to arbitrary power. Drawing on this tradition in political 
thought, domination will be understood in the following terms: 
 A social relationship is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the capacity to 
arbitrarily interfere in the choices available to Y, a dependent agent.  
This conception of domination is often broken into distinct clauses to better clarify its 
content. Pettit (1997, p. 52), for example, breaks it into three clauses. Lovett (2010, p. 
120) has broken down this conception of domination into five necessary conditions 
that are jointly sufficient. Following Pettit and Lovett, the above conception will be 
broken into four conditions. The first is that this conception of domination is directed 
at social relationships, understood in the Weberian sense of strategic interdependence; 
the actions of agents are, to some extent, dependent on the actions of other agents 
(Lovett 2010, p. 35). Second, the social relationship must be characterised by an 
asymmetry of power between agents, which allows one agent to interfere in the 
choices available to another. Third, this asymmetry must be sufficient to produce 
dependency on the part of the weaker agent; dependency does not necessarily entail 
the complete inability to exit the social relationship, but only that the cost of doing so 
would be unreasonably high (Lovett 2010, p. 38-41). Fourth and finally, the power the 
stronger agent possesses must be arbitrary, insofar as the dependent agent cannot 
check the stronger agent. If a social relationship is characterised by these three 
features then it can be considered dominating.  
This paper will engage in descriptive analysis of domination rather than moral 
analysis. It mainly addresses the question “What is domination?” rather than the 
question “Is domination wrong?” This does not imply that domination has no moral 
relevance or even that it is not always wrong, it merely identifies that these are two 
distinct questions. This paper is primarily interested in two debates in the republican 
literature that will have a strong influence on how domination can be used to examine 
social relationships and institutions. A descriptive conception of domination is 
preferable as a starting point, because it seems necessary to know what exactly we are 
discussing before we can assess its morality.  
 The first debate focuses on the relationship between domination and 
institutionalisation. It is fundamentally about the source of domination. In the initial 
conception, domination is interactional, in that it obtains between two agents. It is 
also structural as it is predicated on the asymmetry, dependence, and arbitrariness that 
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exist between agents, the structure of their relationship, rather than psychological 
disposition of agents (Lovett 2010, p. 43-7). This, however, raises concerns about the 
ubiquity of domination; if the mere capacity for arbitrary interference is sufficient 
then domination may be found everywhere, be ineradicable, and not particularly 
useful in examining social institutions. This would also trivialise attempts to minimise 
domination. There are three positions in this debate. The first claims that 
institutionalisation is a necessary condition (Richardson 2002, p. 208-9, Bohman 
2007, p. 23-30, 54-5, 92-7, Bohman 2008, p. 208-9). The second claims institutions 
can be a source of domination, but they are not a necessary condition for domination 
(Pettit 1997, p. 12-13, Maynor 2003, p. 146-9, Laborde 2009, p. 56-8, Pettit 2012, p. 
44). The third argues that institutions can support dominating social relationships but 
are secondary agents of domination (Lovett 2010, p. 36-8, 48-9, Pettit 2012, p. 63-4).  
 The second debate addresses a controversy between Pettit and Lovett over the 
nature of arbitrary power. It is about the site of domination. Pettit (1997, p. 55-8, 
2008), along with the majority of republicans, argues that power is arbitrary when it is 
not compelled to track the interests of those subjected to it or, as he has alternatively 
put it, when it is alien. Lovett and List, on the other hand, claim arbitrariness exists 
only when actions are not externally constrained by impartial rules or a “rule of law 
condition” (List 2006, Lovett 2009, p. 821, Lovett 2010, p. 111-19). This is of great 
interest since the difference between being dominated and being free is determined by 
arbitrariness. The republican tradition is distinguished by the claim that a citizen of a 
free state is not dominated even if she is subjected to a greater level of interference 
than her counterparts living in a despotic state, because a free state exercises non-
arbitrary power (Pettit 1997, Skinner 1998, Maynor 2003, List 2006, p. 209, Lovett 
and Pettit 2009, p. 22-5, Skinner 2010, p. 99-102). It is, therefore, necessary to have a 
clear understanding of what arbitrariness is in order to be able to assess whether a 
social relationship or institution is dominating.  
These debates need to be addressed, because how they are answered will 
fundamentally influence how we examine social relationships and institutions and, if 
we are so committed, how to alleviate domination. The debates on the source and site 
of domination can identify different modes of domination. This is a neglected but 
important element of the republicanism, because if certain modes are overlooked then 
domination will continue to subvert human freedom. I will use reflective equilibrium 
to test the positions in these debates against the considered judgement that slavery is 
the paradigmatic case of domination (Rawls 1999, p. 17-19, 42-5, Rawls 2001, p. 29-
30). The favoured description of domination must be able to capture the salient 
features of slavery. If this is not the case then the conception of domination must 
provide compelling reasons to revise the considered judgement on slavery or else be 
discarded.  
The considered judgement on slavery is appropriate; it features in the 
historical and contemporary republican literature as the primary example of 
domination. Cicero (2001, p. 57-8) expressed doubts that the unskilled labourers 
could be reliable citizens since they were under their employer’s power in the same 
way that a slave is under his master’s power. Skinner (1998, p. 59-70, 2002) has 
shown the influence of the Digest of Justinian’s definition of a slave and the Roman 
historians in shaping the conception of freedom in Anglophone political thought in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The current republican revival has continued 
the use of slavery as the primary example of domination. Slavery has featured 
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prominently as the means to illustrate the difference between freedom as non-
interference and freedom as non-domination; a slave may avoid interference because 
her owner is slothful or kind, but she can never be considered free since she is always 
liable to inference from her master (Pettit 1997, p. 31-5, Viroli 2002, p. 8-9, Maynor 
2003, p. 36-7, Skinner 2008, p. 96-7, Laborde 2009, p. 57, Lovett 2009, p. 281, Lovett 
and Pettit 2009, p. 14, Lovett 2010, p. 154-6). Slavery is the common thread that is 
woven through historical and contemporary republican literature, which makes it a 
stable point for this study of domination. 
The paper will be organised into three parts. The following two sections will 
each address the debates on the source and site of domination. The final section will 
summarise and clarify four general modes of domination.  
On the Source of Domination 
The first debate addresses the relationship between domination and social institutions. 
The initial conception of domination is interactional; it obtains when one agent 
possesses the capacity for interference in the choices available to a dependent agent. 
However, a minority within the republican tradition have argued that this conception 
of domination does not fully capture the “normative” element of domination 
(Richardson 2002, p. 33-34, Bohman 2007, p. 8-9, ch. 2). This is an unconventional 
use of the term “normative.” It does not refer to the morality of domination, but to the 
status and power of agents in social relationships. The normativity of domination is 
the capacity to put another agent under an obligation to obey by virtue of arbitrary 
power. To put it another way, it arbitrarily establishes the norms of a social 
relationship. The argument of these theorists is more stringent than bare normativity. 
It is not the product of a simple act of arbitrary power, but requires the support of 
legitimate or recognised social institutions. Hart’s (1994, p. 82-91) distinction 
between being obliged and having an obligation helps to clarify this point. The 
gunman who draws a pistol on a passerby and demands his wallet obliges compliance 
through the menace of his arms. The legislator puts the citizen under an obligation to 
obey a new law because her power is derived from a social institution that is deemed 
legitimate. In the case of domination, we can distinguish between the condition of the 
gunman’s victim and the slave. It is true that the gunman has arbitrary power over his 
victim, but it is not domination because the victim does not have a duty to obey. The 
slave, by comparison, is subjected to the arbitrary power of his master and is under an 
obligation to obey since slavery is a recognised social institution. The slave lacks the 
normative power to challenge the obligations his owner places upon him and is 
dominated. The gunman, no matter how dangerous, cannot impose an obligation and 
therefore his victim is not dominated. This institutional-normative conception of 
domination is useful as it exposes the normative component of domination, which can 
be understood as the capacity to impose social relationships and set their status 
without reference to the dominated agent’s interests (Richardson 2002, p. 34, Bohman 
2007, p. 95, Bohman 2008, p. 197-9).  
The institutional-normative theorists assert that the initial conception concedes 
too much to the understanding of liberty as non-interference and, as a result, it 
trivialises the condition of the slave by conflating it with simple instances of arbitrary 
power that do not operate under the “colours of right” (Richardson 2002, p. 34). The 
institutional-normative account they offer is the power and authority to change the 
status of an individual by arbitrarily assigning their rights and duties (Hayward 2000, 
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p. 162, Richardson 2002, p. 34, Bohman 2008, p. 198). To put it another way, the 
rules of the social institution are structured in such a way that enables the agent of 
domination to place those subjected to their power under an obligation to obey and 
leaves them without the capacity to adjust or challenge their status (Bohman 2007, p. 
54-5). Dominating agents may act with impunity since the subject of domination lacks 
the power to challenge the rules of the social relationship.  
 That the power of a dominating agent can be institutionally determined is not a 
novel claim. Pettit’s distinction between dominium and imperium, which itself is 
drawn from the Roman historians and moralists, has an element of this. The former 
indicates domination between private agents, such as the gunman over his victim, 
whereas the latter denotes domination of a private agent by an agent of the state, such 
as a tax collector over the subject of an absolute monarch (Pettit 1997, p. 13). 
Moreover, in his recent work Pettit has written about “structural domination” to refer 
to when social practices such as culture or the economy can support dominating social 
relationships (Pettit 2012, p. 63, Pettit 2014, p. 53). This appears to support the idea 
that there are two sources of dominating power: personal and social. Laborde has 
provided a sharper distinction with “agent-relative” and “systemic” domination. 
Agent-relative domination obtains when arbitrary power is determined by the 
personal attributes of the dominating agent (strength, wealth, intelligence, etc.), 
whereas systemic domination obtains when arbitrary power is derived from an 
institutionalised set of rules and customs. Therefore, the gunman’s power is derived 
from his personal attributes, while the slave-owner’s power is mostly determined by 
the social institution of slavery (Laborde 2009, p. 57). Thus, this interpretation of 
domination does not require the power-bearing agent to be a representative of the 
state, but to have the support of background social institutions. The use of social 
institutions in this paper is comparable with how Rawls referred to the family as a 
social institution; it is defined by the congealed practices of individual families 
(Rawls 1999, p. 7-8). To put it another way a social institution defines the rules of a 
game, while the constituent agents are the game’s players (Havel 1991, p. 136-41, 
Pogge 2010, p. 15). A social institution does not need official state recognition to 
exist. For example, women would be subjected to systemic domination in a society 
where informal patriarchy, not codified in law, arbitrarily determined their normative 
status. If this is the case, than the normative element of domination can be unshackled 
from the state and use to refer to the use of power to create the rules of a social 
relationship. The source of domination can be personally or socially constituted.  
 This, however, is not universally affirmed. Lovett appears to reject the notion 
that there is something distinct or independent about social institutions. The master-
slave relationship is encompassed in the interactional relationship between the two 
agents. The background social institution of slavery may intensify the master’s 
capacity to dominate the slave, but it is not constitutive of that relationship. If slavery 
were prohibited but the slave-owner still possessed sufficient power to keep the 
former slave under her control it would not fundamentally alter the master-slave 
relationship (Lovett 2010, p. 36-8, 48-9). Social institutions, therefore, are best 
conceived as secondary agents that support interactional relationships of domination, 
but are not intrinsic to the primary relationship between agent and subject. This 
distinction between primary and secondary agents of domination is drawn from Onora 
O’Neill’s (2001, p. 181) account primary agents of justice and secondary agents of 
justice. In the case of informal patriarchy, Lovett would assert that the agent-relative 
power of men dominates women, though perhaps it is supplemented by informal 
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patriarchy, but at its root there is nothing different between the gunman and the 
patriarch.  
 There are three positions in this debate. The first asserts that domination is 
strictly institutional-normative: a social relationship is dominating if X, an agent, 
possesses the institutionally constituted capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the choices 
available to Y, a dependent agent. The second asserts that a social relationship is 
dominating if X, an agent, possesses the personally or socially constituted capacity to 
arbitrarily interfere in the choices available to Y, a dependent agent. The third claims 
that the initial conception of domination is essentially correct, though social 
institutions may often provide support as secondary agents.  
 The first claim that domination must be determined against an institutional 
background is too strong. It would produce a conception of domination that would be 
incoherent. The claim of Richardson and Bohman is that interactional domination is 
trivial because it does not properly capture the level of normative disempowerment 
within relationships of domination. However, they premise their notion of domination 
on official recognition. The slave is dominated because the social institution of 
slavery is supported by the state in a way that leaves it impossible for the slave to 
contest the terms of the social institution. However, this would mean that de facto 
slavery could not be considered dominating; by de facto slavery I refer to 
relationships that are sufficiently similar to slavery, save for legal recognition. 
Instances of what Joel Quirk (2006) has called “contemporary forms of slavery” do 
not meet the strict normative understanding of domination. It would exclude 
trafficked persons who are caught in debt-bondage as the price for being smuggled 
into another country or children and women who are sold and degraded in the sex 
trade. If the normative conception of domination cannot recognise social relationships 
and institutions that are indistinguishable from slavery but for official recognition, 
then the charge of triviality can be more properly lodged against it rather than the 
personal or mixed conception of domination. If the exercise of private power is 
sufficient to replicate the master-slave relationship without official sanction, the 
quasi-slave-owner has the power to determine the status of the quasi-slave in the way 
that concerns normative theorists. It is unclear why the absence of the “colours of 
right” would make the person in illegal debt-bondage any less dominated. 
Consequently, the position that makes normative power synonymous with official 
institutionalisation does not capture our considered judgements on slavery and runs 
the risk of trivialising unofficial forms of domination. 
If the normative conception is detached from institutionalisation it is more 
plausible, but it becomes unclear how it is different from interactional accounts of 
domination. I will refer to domination that is formally or informally constituted by 
background social institutions as “social” domination, rather than Laborde’s term 
“systemic domination.” This is because systemic domination will be used in the 
debate on the site of domination. Pettit (2006, p. 278-9, 2008, 2014, p. 23, 63-4) 
endorses a social-normative understanding of domination and stresses the importance 
being an empowered free citizen. He claims that dominating agents do not have to 
track the interests of those under their power. The only way that this would be 
impossible is if weaker members of social relationships were sufficiently empowered 
to ensure their interests were being tracked and to check arbitrary interference. This 
requires normative power that is not premised on being able to live a particular 
conception of the good-life, but simply as a counter-measure to domination.  
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This is what underwrites the notion of “antipower” that Pettit (1996, p. 588-
95) used in his early work and has let fall into disuse. Although Pettit was correct to 
abandon the concept of antipower as a synonym for freedom, it helps to bring out the 
normative element of domination and non-domination. A person has antipower when 
they are able “command non-interference” this is a normative power since it is based 
on the capacity to resist an external agent imposing a social relationship with arbitrary 
duties and rights (Pettit 1996, p. 589-90). Pettit associates anti-power with traditional 
rule of law and the regulation of power, but importantly identifies welfare policies as 
providing an important source of anti-power. The common thread between these three 
conditions is that by enhancing antipower it enables agents to resist the arbitrary 
imposition of rights or duties (Pettit 1996, p. 590-2). The core of this argument exists 
in his recent writings on social justice, where he acknowledges that if people are not 
suitably resourced they cannot check invasive power (Pettit 2012, p. 69-70, Pettit 
2014, p. 33-8).  
The importance of antipower has also been noted by institutional-normative 
theorists like Bohman, who notes the importance of citizens having a voice in 
determining the content of their rights and duties (Bohman 2008, p. 199). This is a 
salient point and one that can be generalised to the theory of non-domination in a way 
that is detached from official institutionalisation. If non-domination requires the 
normative power to check arbitrary interference, then domination must also be 
defined in normative terms as the absence of the ability to check arbitrary 
interference. Therefore, the background conditions that establish the terms of the 
social relationship and the status of the agents are intrinsic to the conception of 
domination.  
This normative approach should not be confused with a moralised conception 
of domination. John Christman’s (1998, p. 203) critique of Pettit makes the mistake of 
conflating the two. He claims that non-domination is understood as the absence of 
“unjust” interference and, therefore, domination must be considered “unjust” 
interference. However, this is not only a normative conception of domination but also 
a moralised one. Whether interference is just or unjust appeals to a moral criterion 
that allows such judgements to be made. Consequently, this would trouble a 
conception of domination by making it subsidiary to external values (Carter 2008, p. 
64-6, 81). It would not be domination or non-domination that does the work in 
republican theory but an external conception of the good. Christopher McMahon 
(2005, p. 72) claims that non-domination is a “normative power.” It is not simply 
living as one “ought” to live, but having the ability “to make one’s life in the way it 
ought to be.” However, this notion of normative domination is still unnecessarily 
moralised. It relies upon being prevented from living as one “ought” to live. It is not 
necessary to include the moralised “ought” in a description of domination. It is 
sufficient to say that normative empowerment is a state where agents have the power 
to negotiate or contest the rules of the social relationships. This can be determined 
without reference to any external conception how one “ought” to live or the morality 
of the rules of the social relationship.  
This applies to both interactional and social instances of domination. The 
gunman thought experiment clarifies this assertion and has been put forward by 
Skinner as an example of domination (Skinner 2008, p. 95). A gunman stops a passer-
by and makes the demand “your money or your life.” This, however, occurs in 
circumstances that are akin to the state of nature. In these circumstances, it would 
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seem that a social-normative conception would have little to offer, as there are no 
background social institutions to either prohibit or sanction the actions of the gunman. 
This seems to be a clear case of domination as the victim is clearly in the power of the 
gunman. However, it is useful because it exposes a shortcoming in the institutional-
normative argument that can be used to reconcile these two accounts. In this case, the 
gunman does exercise normative power insofar as he establishes the status of agents 
in a social relationship and assigns the passer-by a position in which he cannot dispute 
or exit the social relationship without incurring unreasonable exit costs. Skinner 
gestures towards this when he claims that the gunman removes the choice of carrying 
on unmolested from the victim. (Skinner 2008, p. 95-6) However, it’s not simply a 
matter of removing choices but also employing arbitrary power to establish the 
victim’s inferior status in the relationship.  This is normative element in the gunman 
case. The use of arbitrary normative power is distinct from arbitrary interactional 
power that the gunman has once the relationship is established.  
This lends credence to Laborde’s distinction between agent-relative and 
systemic forms of domination, but it also brings out a further distinction about the 
source and site of arbitrary power. The gunman case is an agent-relative instance of 
domination in which the gunman exercises normative arbitrary power to establish the 
social relationship that the passer-by cannot contest or exit. The gunman also 
possesses interactional arbitrary power within the relationship, in that the adherence 
to the rule “your money or your life” is dependent on the gunman’s will; he may let a 
defiant passer-by go without shooting or he may shoot a compliant passer-by. In the 
case of legal slavery the normative power that establishes the social relationship is 
located in the social institution of slavery, but the slave-owner holds interactional 
arbitrary power. In this case normative power can be described as social as opposed to 
personal. Lovett’s interactional understanding of domination does not hold up to 
scrutiny. The social institution of slavery does not simply support the slave-master, 
but is the source of the interactional power of the slave-owner. If slavery was 
abolished but the slave-owner continued to dominate her former slaves by keeping 
them in chains, then this is would be a new dominating social relationship. This is 
because the slave-owner is now serving as the normative source and the interactional 
site arbitrary power.  
This is the most important insight that can be drawn from the institutional-
normative conception of domination. Domination is often characterised by normative 
and interactional power. This claim is qualified because while all instances must be 
normative in some sense, even the gunman case, there is the possibility that the 
exercise of arbitrary normative power to establish a social relationship is sufficient to 
establish domination even if it does not produce interactional arbitrary power. This 
issue will be taken up in the next part of the paper. 
To clarify, domination is always normative insofar as it is characterised by the 
use of power to set up the rules or norms of a social relationship in a way that cannot 
be contested by the agent subjected to domination. The mistake that is made by 
theorists of institutional-normative domination like Richardson and Bohman is to tie 
this normative power to official institutions. The source of normative power may be 
social, thought of in a broader sense than official recognition, or it may personal.  
However, Lovett’s neglect of institutional sources obscures an important distinction 
about the site of domination.  
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The concern about triviality and ubiquity may linger; if the mere capacity for 
arbitrary interference is sufficient for domination to obtain then it will be found 
everywhere and be ineradicable. The concern about triviality has already been 
addressed, there are forms of domination, such as informal slavery, which are not 
institutionalised but are non-trivial. The claim that domination would be endemic in 
society if it were not conceptually predicated on institutional sanction is contingent on 
the belief that persons would not be in a situation of mutual uncertainty. Persons may 
operate with the reasonable belief that they have the capacity to check attempts at 
arbitrary interference by other persons. Pettit (1997, p. 94-5) mentions this in his 
discussion of ways in which domination could be minimised without the state. The 
problem with individualistic pursuits of non-domination is that they would create a 
security dilemma. If one agent improves their antipower, other agents may interpret 
this as a threat and so on. The establishment of a free state ensure a relatively equal or 
reciprocal distribution of antipower. It may be true that arbitrary interference can 
never completely be eliminated, but it can be minimised. The ubiquity complaint is 
premised on the notion that domination is a black and white issue rather than a matter 
of intensity. The threat of being robbed is a fact that may never be able to be 
eliminated, but it is a less intense form of domination and one that would not 
undermine the capacity of persons to formulate and pursue a life plan, whereas the 
slave’s plans are perpetually subject to her master’s permission (Pettit 1997, p. 74-7). 
The belief that domination should be fully eliminated places unrealistic demands on 
republican theory; this is why the goal is the minimisation of domination rather than 
its total eradication (Lovett 2010, p. 173-79).  
This section has argued that all domination is normative insofar as it 
arbitrarily determines the status of agents. However, the source of normative power 
may come from individual agents, as was the case with the gunman, or social, as is 
the case with slavery. The institutional-normative reading of domination is too 
narrow, as it excludes social-normative forms of domination, such as informal 
slavery, whereas the interactional reading of Lovett is too broad, in that it cannot 
differentiate the sources of domination. The conception of domination will be 
modified to reflect this: a social relationship is dominating if X, an agent, possesses 
the personally or socially constituted capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the choices 
available to Y, a dependent agent.  
On the Site of Domination 
This part of the paper will address a disagreement between Pettit and Lovett over the 
meaning of arbitrary power and whether domination can be systemic. They both put 
forward accounts of arbitrariness that attempt to avoid the debate over subjective and 
objective interests. Initially Pettit (1997, p. 55) claimed that power is arbitrary when it 
is not compelled to track the “relevant” interests of those subjected to it. The use of 
“relevant,” “avowed”, and “avowable” interests subjected Pettit to the charge that he 
was employing a moralised or unstable conception of domination, depending on 
whether interests were considered objective or subjective (Christman 1998, 
Richardson 2002, Larmore 2004, MacMahon 2005, Carter 2008, Lovett 2010). This 
line of criticism, however, misses the core of republicanism’s commitment to non-
domination. It can maintain an agnostic position on interests; what it is concerned 
with are constraints on power. Pettit (2006, p. 276) clarified this when he wrote that 
by avowable interests he meant “avowal-ready” not “avowal-worthy.” The former 
speaks to normative empowerment, while the latter is a moralised conception of 
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interests. Non-arbitrary power is constrained by those subjected to it when it allows 
them to ensure that their avowal-ready interests are being tracked. This position was 
clarified in Pettit’s (2008, p. 106) use of “alien control” as a synonym for domination. 
An agent is subjected to alien control when their choices are subject to the control of 
another agent over whom they have no power. Substantively this does not add to 
Pettit’s existing notion of arbitrariness but merely clarifies it in a way that sets aside 
the debate on interests by focusing on the important of power and control. Lovett, on 
the other hand, has argued that non-arbitrariness only requires the presence of 
publically known and impartially enforced rules. It does not require those subjected to 
it to exercise control over these rules. The two conceptions of arbitrariness can be 
understood in the following terms: 
 A1: Power is arbitrary when it is not subjected to external control by the 
agents affected by it. 
 A2: Power is arbitrary when it is not subjected to external control. 
It will be argued that A2 is not plausible given the distinction between source and site 
of domination. It will be shown that Lovett’s notion of non-arbitrariness is not 
sensitive to the use of normative arbitrary power to establish social domination. This 
develops Pettit’s notion of alien control by confirming the possibility of systemic 
domination. It is true that Pettit(2012, p. 43) has made reference to “structural 
domination” in his most recent work insofar as he has made brief remarks that 
background social institutions may vitiate choice in a way that is similar to invasion. 
However, he tends to argue that structural sources of domination only serve as 
support for interactional domination between agents (Pettit 2012, p. 63, 126, Pettit 
2014, p. 53). This is also distinct from Laborde’s understanding of systemic 
domination as it refers to the site of domination and is contrasted with interactional 
domination.  
 The account of arbitrariness put forward by Pettit claims that power is 
arbitrary or alien when it is not compelled to track the interests of the agents subjected 
to it. However, this is not a moralised account. It may be that the act of arbitrary 
interference is in the “substantive” interests of those subjected to it; what matters is 
the absence of control over its exercise by those subjected to it. Therefore, the agent 
with the capacity of interference needs to be forced to track the interests of those 
subjected to it in order for it to be considered non-arbitrary or non-alien (Pettit 1997, 
p. 55). If an agent can check interference they cannot be said to depend on the leave 
of another agent. (Pettit 1997, p. 55-8, Maynor 2003, p. 38-9). The standard example 
of this in the republican tradition is that if the state is suitably invigilated by the 
people, via democratic elections for example, it cannot exercise arbitrary power or 
alien control. This can require agents to delegate some of their powers to a proxy or 
deputy, such as a member of parliament, but power ultimately lies with them. The 
individual citizen will have the sufficient command of antipower to ensure that they 
are not subjected to domination by private persons or government officials. The 
central claim for Pettit is that power is rendered non-arbitrary when it is subject to 
external control by those subjected to it.  
Lovett agrees that an account of non-arbitrary power demands reliable external 
constraints that are agnostic about the nature of interests, but claims that it does not 
necessarily have be constrained by those subjected to it. In order for power to be non-
arbitrary, it does not need to be compelled to track interests by those whom it affects, 
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but merely provide agents with a secure status. This is dependent on two conditions 
being satisfied: the first is that the rules must be publicly known so that those 
subjected to them know where they stand; second, these rules must be impartially 
administered (Lovett 2010, p. 115). This makes power non-arbitrary because it is not 
contingent on the will of the power-bearing agent (MacMahon 2005, p. 69 fn.4). It 
may be helpful to think of this as third-party invigilation. The ability to check 
interference is held by an impartial agent and exercised on behalf of the subject of 
interference. However, these are not deputised or proxy agents. They hold power in 
their own right. They are only required to ensure that the rules are properly enforced. 
This claim appears to be compatible with the considered judgement on slavery. The 
slave is subjected to arbitrary power insofar as she cannot ever be sure of her status 
with her owner, as every action she takes is by her master’s leave. Her master’s power 
over her is not subjected to external constraint. The actions of an agent who knows 
the rules of the game and is confident that they will be impartially enforced are not 
predicated on the leave of another agent.   
On its face this is a coherent explanation of arbitrariness and one that seems to 
be in line with our considered judgements about domination, at least as far as it 
appeals to a distinction between the condition of the slave and the condition of the 
subject of regularly administered rules. However, it has a potential problem insofar as 
it would allow for certain forms of institutional discrimination to be compatible with 
non-domination. It would allow an idealised version of apartheid South Africa, where 
the white minority codifies the discriminatory laws pertaining to the black and 
coloured populations and sets up an independent judiciary to ensure that these laws 
are impartially enforced. The discriminated population has their status enshrined in 
law and protected by an effective, impartial legal system. In these circumstances the 
subjects of institutional discrimination are not in a situation of perpetual uncertainty 
because they can be sure that laws will be administered impartially, unlike slaves who 
must forever be wary of their master’s changing moods.  
It does not seem to be farfetched to assume that many people would hold the 
intuition that an apartheid regime, even in an ideal form, would be dominating. The 
only way a group of people could be denied access to political power, employment 
and educational opportunities, and certain public spaces like parks and beaches is 
through the exercise of arbitrary power. Lovett attempts to soothe this worry by 
making two claims. The first is that domination should not be the only concept that 
we use to assess social relationships and institutions. It may be that institutional 
discrimination is not dominating but that it is unfair. Indeed, trying to make 
domination a catch-all term would limit its incisiveness. Secondly, the alternative 
would make democracy the analytic antithesis of domination. This, in his opinion, 
would trivialise the argument that democracy is the best course to minimise 
domination by making it a forgone conclusion (Lovett 2010, p. 117-8). Therefore, we 
should revise our intuitions with the knowledge that there are other tools for moral 
criticism and acknowledge that, while domination is not the antithesis of democracy, 
democracy is perhaps the best solution to domination. Yet despite these claims, this 
argument is unpersuasive. 
Lovett’s argument is framed against the way arbitrariness was formulated by 
Pettit, which has been taken up by other republican theorists and critics, as a matter of 
tracking interests. However, recently Pettit (2008, esp. p. 106-8, 110-4) has 
reinterpreted arbitrariness as “alien control.” A person is subjected to alien control 
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when she is unable to counter or redirect interference. This discards references to 
“tracking interests” and replaces it with normative empowerment within social 
relationships. This is not moralised, but premised on the imbalances of power rather 
than how power ought to be utilised (Pettit 2008, p. 116-7). However, the member of 
Lovett’s discriminated group does not seem to be under alien control. If a member of 
the privileged community infringes on the publically known rules of the social 
relationship the members of the discriminated group can check or redirect this power 
by appealing to the justice system. The impartial enforcement of the rules appears to 
empower the discriminated group. They may not enjoy equality but, since their 
activities are not dependent on the leave of an identifiable agent, they are not 
subjected to alien control.  
Yet, this is only because Pettit’s notion of alien control has been 
conceptualised as interactional and does not address the use of arbitrary or alien 
power to establish these relationships and broader social institutions. In his attempt to 
show that his conception of domination is not based on moralised notions of interests, 
Pettit has obscured the normative element of domination. This has deprived him of a 
great resource in his debate with Lovett as the similarity between the slave and the 
discriminated minority is evident at the systemic level. He has briefly speculated that 
the vitiation of choice, through the denial of resources may amount to a “structural 
form of invasion” (Pettit 2012, p. 43). Yet, apart from a few asides he remains 
focussed on interactional forms of domination. So this is not so much a break from 
Pettit’s idea of domination, but an elaboration on the site of domination.  
Lovett’s notion of arbitrariness insensitive to the use of power that establishes 
social relationships. The subjects of discrimination have had their status under the law 
defined through the use of arbitrary normative power. The administration of the law 
may be non-arbitrary, but the normative background in which these laws were 
generated is arbitrary insofar as those subjected to the rules are not involved in 
formulating them or lack the ability to challenge them. It may be that the subjects of 
institutional discrimination are not subjected to the same level of uncertainty as a 
slave, but their choices have been subjected to the same type of modification. Pettit 
claims that alien control alters the choices available to those subjected to it by 
reducing their ability to make deliberative choices, it may remove specific options 
that would be available or it may replace one option with another. The discriminated 
group has had their sphere of choice circumscribed and perhaps their capacity to make 
deliberative choices reduced by the discriminatory regime (Pettit 2008, p. 106-7). 
Alternatively, we could use Pettit’s more recent terms and say that systemic 
domination constitutes an invasion of the choices available to the discriminated 
group, but only appears to vitiate choice (Pettit 2012, p. 35-44). The laws that 
establish the available choices for the members of the subjected group are made 
available only by the leave of the empowered group. In this sense, the members of the 
discriminated group are exposed to systemic domination without interactional 
domination.  
This can be clarified by returning to the gunman thought experiment. As 
before the gunman stops the passer-by and establishes the rule “your money or your 
life.” However, the uncertainty of the passer-by is removed by the presence of an 
accomplice. The gunman explains that if he violates his rule, by shooting the passer-
by after being given the wallet, the accomplice will bludgeon the gunman with a 
rubber cosh. As the rules of the social relationship are public and the accomplice is 
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independent, the passer-by can plan with reasonable confidence. By Lovett’s account, 
there is no domination in this case. Yet, this does not take into account the initial use 
of normative arbitrary power to establish the status of the passer-by. It seems strange 
to claim that the accomplice’s scrutiny of the gunman’s actions remedies this. After 
all, the accomplice is an accessory to the initial use of power. The fact that the 
accomplice in the gunman case and the legal system in the institutional discrimination 
case are functionally separate from the gunman and the legislature does not mean they 
are not part of a broader system of social institutions that are characterised by 
domination. This simple instance of personally constituted systemic domination 
shows why third party invigilation cannot be considered sufficient for non-
arbitrariness to obtain.  
The discriminated majority case is an example of socially constituted systemic 
domination, but one that does not produce interactional arbitrary power. The exercise 
of arbitrary power at the systemic level establishes social institutions that the majority 
cannot revise or dispute, even if they are not subjected to interactional arbitrary power 
in the social relationships nested within these institutions. The notion of systemic 
domination has been resisted in republican theory, but does not need to be. Until 
recently, Pettit (1997, p. 52, 79) predicated his conception of domination as 
necessarily requiring an agent, be it individual or corporate, and not a network, 
system, or “whatever.” This is a matter of stipulation, as it does not have an explicit 
justification. However, Lovett provides one; domination requires an agent because it 
requires someone to be able to have interactional arbitrary power over another person. 
He asks us to imagine an island where slavery is institutionalised. However, one night 
the slave-owners experience a revelation that it is immoral to own another person and 
abandon the island never to return. The slavery law remains on the books but without 
any owners it does not make sense to say that the slaves remain dominated as no one 
has the capacity to interfere with the choices available to them (Lovett 2010, p. 48-9). 
Even Laborde’s (2009, p. 57) systemic domination is predicated on agents, such as 
transnational corporations, being given systemic advantages that allow them to 
exercise interactional arbitrary power. There is a general presumption that the site of 
domination must be interactional. Indeed, even Pettit’s recent thoughts on structural 
domination seem to require an agent exercising arbitrary power (Pettit 2012, p. 63, 
Pettit 2014, p. 53).  
Yet, the exercise of arbitrary power at the systemic level does not appear 
relevantly distinct. It is exercised in a way that cannot be checked or redirected and 
limits the choices available to those subjected to it. Pettit (2008, p. 113) asserts that 
alien control undermines the “can do assumptions” of those subjected to it. The slave 
is aware that he cannot go to the market without his master’s leave. Systemic arbitrary 
power accomplishes the same thing. The victim of the gunman and his accomplice 
may operate with more certainty than the slave, but he cannot carry on his way 
without being robbed or shot. Likewise, the member of the discriminated group may 
have a zone of non-alien control, but it is circumscribed by the exercise of arbitrary 
power at a systemic level. For example, a state may have an established religion and 
prohibit members of other sects from attending the most prestigious universities. 
These laws are publically known and impartially enforced. If a student from an 
independent church is denied admission, it is not the result of the use of interactional 
arbitrary power by a bigoted admissions officer. The admissions officer is playing by 
the rules. Systemic domination requires the support of agents to be maintained, but 
this does not mean that these agents are exercising arbitrary power. Yet, clearly the 
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choices available to the minority student have been arbitrarily circumscribed in a 
comparable way to that of the slave.  
This shows why Pettit should not have been so quick to drop antipower in his 
analysis of domination. Antipower is not just directed at checking interactional 
arbitrary power between persons, but it requires agents be able to challenge how their 
status is determined (Pettit 1996, p. 594-5, Bohman 2008, p. 199). Lovett’s 
conception of non-arbitrariness is flawed because while the discriminated minority 
may have a zone of existential predictability, they lack antipower. This can be seen by 
using Pettit’s eyeball test; a person is not dominated when she is “able to look the 
other in the eye” secure that she enjoys her rights without another’s leave (Pettit 1997, 
p. 60-1, Pettit 2012, p. 84-5). The discriminated majority must fail this test because 
they are aware that no matter how proofed they are against interactional domination, 
their choices have been systemically circumscribed in a way that they cannot dispute. 
They are known to be inferior in society.  
A truculent critic might object that systemic domination is a misleading term 
and the apartheid example is an instance of group domination; the privileged group 
has employed the law to dominate the disadvantaged group. Systemic domination 
implies that it is the system that dominates rather than the group, but the law only 
functions when it is employed by people. Systemic and interactional modes of 
domination refer to the site of domination, not the agent. In the latter’s case the site of 
domination is the interaction between two agents in which one has the capacity to 
arbitrarily interfere with the choices available to a dependent agent, as is the case with 
a master and a slave. The apartheid example is devoid of this interactional 
domination, as the members of the advantaged group must conform to the letter of the 
law. The university administrator who enforces discriminatory rules is not a 
dominating agent, as she does not exercise interactional arbitrary power, but is an 
agent of domination, as she supports systemic domination. A dominating agent would 
be able to exercise arbitrary judgement in who is admitted into the university, while 
an agent of domination is only in a position to enforce rules derived from the use of 
systemic domination. 
The question of whether a system can dominate without agents is interesting, 
but slightly outside the scope of this paper. However, if the reader will indulge a 
rather fanciful thought experiment, I will hazard a tentative answer. In this case the 
laws that govern the apartheid regime are externally given by a legislator who then 
promptly dies. The laws are impartially enforced, not by the privileged group, but by 
a series of automatons; they enforce the law impartially and cannot be reprogrammed. 
In this case all groups have no influence over their status, even though one group is 
privileged they cannot be said to dominate the others since they do not have systemic 
or interactional arbitrary power. They do not even act as agents of domination. The 
automatons cannot be said to dominate since they are not agents, but only machines 
with no will of their own. The legislator cannot be said to dominate after the laying 
down the law since he is dead and has no agency. It seems at least possible that this 
would be an instance of “pure” systemic domination. However, given the remote 
possibility of automaton-enforced apartheid, it does not seem a particularly pressing 
issue for a conception of domination in the present day.  
Lovett’s (2010, p. 48) dismissal of Václav Havel’s claim that communism was 
a system in which all persons dominated each other misses the importance of systemic 
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domination. Havel (1991, p. 136-8) provides the example of a greengrocer who puts 
up a Marxist slogan in the shop he manages, knowing that if he does not he will be 
fired. In doing so, he endorses the “rules of the game” which enables its continuation 
and, indeed, its existence (Havel 1991, p. 136-8). The shopkeeper and the admissions 
officers both act in a way that, while non-arbitrary, supports a system that arbitrarily 
limits the “can do assumptions” of some of its participants. Therefore, it must be 
admitted that systemic domination, where no agent possesses the capacity for 
interactional arbitrary interference, is a conceptual possibility. This understanding of 
institutional domination is similar to Valentini’s (2011, p. 137-41) defence of 
systemic coercion, in which a system of rules can be considered coercive if it 
foreseeably and avoidably places non-trivial constraints on some agent’s freedom. 
This distinction between systemic coercion and domination is that the latter requires 
the system to be imposed arbitrarily and be outside of the control over those subjected 
to it. The imposition of a free state, to use a classic example, would not be an instance 
of systemic domination since it would be controlled by those subjected to it.  
Lovett’s account is unpersuasive since it does not capture the possibility of the 
socially constituted arbitrary power being used to establish relationships that are not 
characterised by interactional arbitrary power. Consequently, the notion of 
arbitrariness that seems most plausible is A1: power is arbitrary when it is not 
subjected to external control by the agents affected by it. This endorses Pettit’s 
understanding of alien control, but requires it to be extended beyond an interactional 
understanding to address systemic domination. It modifies Pettit’s alien control by 
reviving his old notion of antipower to explicate the systemic dimension. Therefore, 
the initial conception of domination must be further modified to accommodate this 
distinct site: a social relationship or institution is dominating if X, an agent, possesses 
the capacity to arbitrarily interfere, either interactionally or systemically, in the 
choices available to Y, a dependent agent. In the case of X in circumstances of 
systemic domination, the agent or agents in question are the ones that shape the 
systemic background using arbitrary power. It does not refer to the agents that then 
enforce the systemic background.  
Conclusion 
This paper has developed the conception of domination derived from the republican 
tradition. It has stressed the importance of the source and site of domination. 
Domination is inherently normative, in a non-moralised way, in that it requires the 
exercise of power that determines the status of agents within a social relationship. 
Normative power can be personally or socially constituted. It was shown that the site 
of domination can be interactional or systemic. This produces a general conception of 
domination that can be understood in the following terms: 
 A social relationship or institution is dominating if X, an agent, possesses the 
personally or socially constituted capacity to arbitrarily interfere, either 
interactionally or systemically, in the choices available to Y, a dependent 
agent. 
Domination can therefore manifest in four general modes:  
i. Domination can be personally constituted and interactionally arbitrary. The 
example of this is the isolated gunman case.  
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ii. Domination can be personally constituted and systemically arbitrary. The 
example of this is the abetted gunman case. 
iii. Domination can be socially constituted and interactionally arbitrary. The 
example of this is slavery. 
iv. Domination can be socially constituted and systemically arbitrary. The 
example of this is the discriminatory regime with publically known and 
impartially enforced laws  
These four patterns of domination are useful because they provide templates that can 
be used to assess the character of social institutions and relationships.  
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